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Preface 
 
In front of you lies my Master Thesis, written in order to complete my degree in Film 
and Photographic Studies at Leiden University. With this thesis I wrap up my final year 
at Leiden University, this time as a Master’s student.  
  In 2010 I came to Leiden as a youngster, fresh from the VWO, ready to start my 
Bachelors in Art History. Unfortunately, this turned out to be the wrong choice for me 
and I lost all pleasure in studying for a while. So after some deliberation I decided to 
follow my heart, starting a HBO education in Photographic Design at the Fotovakschool 
Amsterdam, which I completed in 2015. However, after a year away from university I 
started to miss the challenge academic education brought me and took another shot 
at obtaining a BA, this time in Film and Literary Studies. This proved to be a match 
made in heaven, even though I am still surprised about it myself. I was never a huge 
fan of literature nor a film buff, although I loved reading as a child. But the way in 
which the arts were approached in this BA suited me very well. I loved the critical and 
analytic way of thinking we were taught and had no trouble obtaining my degree. In 
my BA thesis I wrote about indexicality for the first time, indexicality of the creator of 
art to be precise. 
  After finishing my Bachelors I had no doubt about what I wanted to do next. I 
had looked at this Master’s program when I was still in the Art History program six 
years ago and I had not changed my mind since. So I enrolled for the MA Film and 
Photographic Studies, which nicely combined my two BA programs. I knew in advance 
that it was going to be a tough year, but boy, did it exceed my expectations. After the 
first introductory workshop week of the elective Editorial and Curatorial Training 
Program with Bas Vroege, it was clear that we would have to work hard to reach the 
finish line. This very thesis proved to be the biggest mountain I had to climb, but 
fortunately I have made it to the top. 
  But this year has also brought me loads of invaluable experiences. I have 
learned what goes on “behind the scenes” of this MA program as a student member of 
the Departmental Teachings Committee, I got experience as a board member as the 
chair of our study association PixCel and I was a part of the very first Humanities Buddy 
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Programme of the Humanities Faculty. All in all, I got to meet a lot of interesting 
people, attended great lectures and gained valuable experience for my future career. 
My next step will be a job as a cataloguer for the photography collection of the 
Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, which I look forward to starting enormously! 
  The idea for this thesis has been in my head for quite a while. I wrote my BA 
thesis on the index of the maker in a graphic novel, a film and a photography project. 
For my MA thesis, I wanted to dive further into the relation between the index and 
photography, more specifically in camera-less photography, which fascinates me 
greatly and I work without a camera as a photographer myself. Luckily, my thesis 
supervisor Tineke de Ruiter saw the value of the research I wanted to do and gave me 
the green light. It has been a tough few months, but I still find the topic of 
photographic indexicality fascinating and theoretically challenging, so I have never 
worked on this thesis with aversion. 
  The title of this thesis refers to an essay by Professor of Philosophy John Perry 
called “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, in which he goes into the value and 
problematics of linguistic indicators such as “me” and “you”. Perry’s ideas were later 
contested by Professors of Philosophy Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, who aptly 
titled their book The Inessential Indexical. I, however, want to prove that the indexical 
is not insignificant at all, therefore I return to Perry’s phrasing.  
  Finally, I would like to thank a few people for their support with this MA thesis. 
First of all, I would like to thank my dear parents for making it possible for me to follow 
this program, but also for the endless support and coaching. I would also like to thank 
my boyfriend Sandrik for enduring a lot of stress and whining, and for proofreading 
this whole thesis. I also thank my thesis supervisor Tineke de Ruiter for providing me 
with critical questions and feedback all the way. Finally, I would like to thank Peter 
Verstraten for finding the time in his busy schedule to take on the task of second 
reader for this thesis.  
I hope you will enjoy reading the following. 
 
Cobie Hijma 
Leiden, 07-08-2017   
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Introduction 
 
These past few years a lot of art fairs and publications on photography have begun to 
include camera-less photography in their selections. For example, at the annual 
photography collectors fair Unseen in Amsterdam, the amount of camera-less works 
on offer seems to grow every year. Strikingly a lot of photographers have recently 
chosen to renounce the apparatus that is mostly used as, and at times almost 
synonymous to, photography: the camera. When most people think of photography, 
they think of expensive cameras, big lenses and the-more-the-better megapixels. 
However, in principle the word “photography” means “writing with light” and does not 
necessarily imply any kind of apparatus to do so. As French philosopher and art 
historian Hubert Damisch states in the essay “Five Notes on the Phenomenology of 
Photography” (1978): “Theoretically speaking, photography is nothing other than a 
process of recording, a technique of inscribing, in an emulsion of silver salts, a stable 
image generated by a ray of light. Note that this definition neither assumes the use of 
a camera, nor does it imply that the image obtained is that of an object or scene from 
the external world” (287).1  
  Could we then say that camera-less photography is further away or closer to 
the “roots” of the medium? The camera as mediator has been eliminated, which 
makes the “writings with light” on the material more direct compared to a 
conventional photograph. On the other hand camera-less pictures are always abstract 
or abstracted, which diminishes their ability to form iconic relations with the visible 
world. 
  The relationship between a photograph and the subject it depicts is always 
indexical: the subject has to have been in front of the camera in order to reflect rays of 
light that the light sensitive layer in the camera can record. Without the presence of 
the object, there would be no image of the object. But how does this work if the 
                                                          
1 This definition by Damisch does not yet include digital photography. Digitally generated images and the 
camera-less mode have a slightly more complex relationship, which I will go into in the first chapter 
when I discuss the analogue trend in the camera-less mode.  
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camera is eliminated from the equation?2 A photogram, a technique where one places 
an object directly onto photographic paper, gives only the outline of the object. Other 
camera-less techniques yield images that have no iconic relationship to the subject at 
all. The indexical relationship between object and depiction nevertheless remains the 
same: an object was in the presence of the photographic paper in order to produce an 
image.  
  The way in which I use the terms icon and index is based on Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s theory of semiotics, in which he discerns three different types of signs: the 
icon, the index and the symbol. The first two sign types will be pivotal to my argument. 
In short, Peirce sees the icon as a type of sign that refers to the visible world based on 
likeness to that world. The index, on the other hand, refers to the visible world on the 
basis of proximity; it is a trace of something, a physical imprint.  
  In her article “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America” (1977) Rosalind 
Krauss argues that a photograph is as much iconic as it is indexical (“Notes” 753). I, 
however, wish to argue that this balance shifts towards the indexical if an image is 
produced without a camera and that the meaning of the image is therefore 
inextricably connected to this physical relationship of the depicted with the visible 
world. It is the photographic index that determines the meaning of camera-less 
photography, but it cannot do so on its own. An examination of a number of case 
studies will show that the index is either full or empty, which means this sign type will 
always have to be supported, to make a hierarchy in the chaos, or filled by something 
outside of itself.  
Floris Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme 
My first case study is a series of photograms by German photographer Floris Neusüss 
(b. 1937). He is a pioneer in the field of photograms, more specifically photograms of 
human bodies. Neusüss sees the photogram as the ideal photographic image, because 
it is a “theoretically unending space” (Artsy) without a horizon and perspective, that 
                                                          
2 In the article “A Set-theoretic Approach to Indication and Indexicality in Photography” Emanuele 
Martino describes the photographic index in the form of mathematical equations, thereby proving that 
the index can be approached as a function, as a mathematical form (291).  
3 From now on, I will refer to the first article Krauss published under the name “Notes on the Index: 
Seventies Art in America” by the abbreviated title “Notes”, and to the second article she published with 
the same title as “Notes, Part 2”, making the same distinction between the two as Krauss did herself in 
the full title (see list of references).  
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offers him the freedom to create and manipulate his images as he pleases. He 
therefore sees his images more as paintings than as photographs, because of the step-
by-step manner in which he creates his images. His photograms are abstracted 
because of the photogram technique employed, but still to some extent figurative. The 
relation between the subject and the representation is therefore iconic, highly 
indexical and even physical. 
  The series Körperfotogramme (1960-1983) consists of life size photograms of 
human beings on large sheets of photographic paper. The results are impressively 
large images of the human body, portrayed in an unusual fashion. Not only are the 
bodies now two dimensional, we also seem to be looking at them from “below”. The 
photogram technique ensures that the outline of the bodies is clearly contrasted 
against the background. However, the surface of the person “posing” for the image is 
darkened, because hardly any light can pass between the paper and the body when 
one lays down on the photographic paper. The Körperfotogramme therefore seem 
otherworldly, extra-terrestrial even and fascinate the viewer because they portray 
something so familiar in such an unfamiliar way.4 The person posing is about as tall as 
we are and seems to be so close to the surface of the picture that we can almost touch 
them. 
  It could be said that Neusüss’ photograms are hardly “contemporary” 
photograms, since he produced his Körperfotogramme between 1960 and 1983. 
However, since he is still active as a “photogrammer” and his working method has 
hardly changed, he could have made these photograms of human bodies recently as 
well. I therefore choose to still categorise this series as “contemporary”. His more 
recent series Anteidola from 2002 shows that his method of working is still equal to his 
workflow in the 1960s and ‘70s, comprising of photograms of classical statues in the 
Glyptothek in München.  
Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died 
My second case study is a project that is created without a camera, but also without 
putting the subject of the image directly onto photographic material. In June 2008 
                                                          
4 The idea of people finding something familiar fascinating because it is portrayed in an unfamiliar way is 
extensively discussed by Masahiro Mori in his seminal essay “The Uncanny Valley” from 1970. 
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photographers Adam Broomberg (b. 1970) and Oliver Chanarin (b. 1971) travelled to 
Afghanistan to spend time with some British Army units for their project The Day 
Nobody Died. They did not want to take conventional journalistic photographs of the 
atrocities they witnessed when they travelled with the army units. As they state 
themselves in the manifesto that accompanies the project, also called The Day Nobody 
Died: “we have struggled with the role of representation, with how to represent these 
events and how representation itself is complicit in their instigation and perpetuation” 
(Broomberg and Chanarin 2). The two photographers therefore chose to let go of “all 
events a photographer would normally record” (Broomberg and Chanarin 1) and 
focussed on finding a way to represent the trauma without actually showing it. 
  The method they found to convey what a war zone feels like was to fill a box 
with a big role of photographic paper. This box itself became an passenger on the trip, 
like an additional person that was embedded in the army unit. The soldiers took care 
of the box, just like they took care of the two photographers in their midst, transferred 
the box to different vehicles and made sure the box remained closed to avoid light 
leaking in. To show how this box of photographic paper became a mise-en-abyme for 
the photographers themselves, Broomberg and Chanarin created a movie with the box 
as the protagonist.5 
  Once in Afghanistan, the duo took a six meter piece of photographic paper out 
of the box each time and exposed it to whatever they encountered to “register” it on 
the photosensitive layer, as “proxy, a mute witness” (Broomberg and Chanarin 2). The 
results are representations of conflict and suffering, without actually showing it. There 
is no visible similarity to the subject (icon) and also no physical relationship of subject 
and photographic material (photogram), so the relationship between subject and 
depiction is solely indexical due to the rays of light used to create the image. 
Structure of argument 
The question that will guide this thesis will therefore be: how does the photographic 
index function as the determining factor in the production of meaning in the camera-
less case studies Körperfotogramme (body photograms) by Floris Neusüss and the 
project The Day Nobody Died by Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin? 
                                                          
5 Available on Youtube (see list of references).  
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  I will answer this question in three steps. In the first chapter, I will discuss what 
the sign-categories of icon and index are in the semiotics of Peirce and how the 
conventional photograph relates to the photographic index. Additionally, I will explain 
what the contemporary photographic discourse around camera-less photography 
entails.  
  In the second chapter, I will frame the index in photography theory by 
discussing big names in the field such as Roland Barthes, Rosalind Krauss and Geoffrey 
Batchen. On the basis of this theoretical discussion, I will explain how the photogram 
and the camera-less photographic record relate to the photographic index and how 
this differs from the way the conventional photograph relates to this category of signs. 
  In the third and final chapter I will show how this different relationship of the 
camera-less photographic record with the index problematizes photography’s 
production of meaning. I will use an extensive analysis of both Floris Neusüss’ 
Körperfotogramme and Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died 
to show how these case studies put the photographic index under stress, but also 
foreground it, in two different ways, in the process of production of meaning.  
  I will conclude that the camera-less photographic record shows that the 
photographic index is twofold, and neither variety of the index is capable of producing 
meaning on its own. The photographic index is indispensable for the production of 
meaning with the camera-less photographic record, but needs to be filled or 
contextualized to work as such.  
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Chapter one 
“Icon”, “index”, conventional photography and the current camera-less photographic 
discourse 
 
Introduction 
In this first chapter I want to discuss the sign types “icon” and “index” as formulated by 
semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce, for I will be using these two terms frequently 
throughout all three chapters of this thesis. Because semioticians are known for their 
very intricate writings on their ideas on semiotics, I will be using the very clearly 
written Semiotics, the basics (2002) by Daniel Chandler to elaborate on Peirce’s 
teachings.  
  Following the discussion of the icon and the index as categories of signs, I will 
set out to relate the conventional photograph, in other words the photograph created 
by means of a camera, to the photographic index. As stated in the introduction, every 
photograph is by definition an indexical sign of what is depicted on it. Simply put, the 
photograph cannot exist without a physical bond with the subject it represents. The 
rays of light that fall onto the subject are reflected by it, into the camera. These rays 
have thus physically “touched” the subject before they reach the photosensitive 
surface in the camera, producing a physical relationship between the subject and the 
image of that subject. 
  Finally, I want to show what the contemporary photographic discourse on 
camera-less photography entails, as a foundation for the second chapter in which the 
relation between the camera-less photographic record and the semiotic categories of 
the index and the icon will be discussed. A camera-less trend can be discerned in the 
current field of photography. In this first chapter I want to take the opportunity to look 
at the characteristics of some of these camera-less projects that have been created in 
the last few decades. It is only after an examination of the characteristics of these 
works and their makers’ reasons for renouncing the camera and also comparing them 
to some historical camera-less photography that we can explore how these 
contemporary camera-less photographic works relate to the semiotic sign-types of 
icon and index in chapter two. I will discuss two recent exhibitions and accompanying 
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publications which are completely devoted to camera-less photography, namely 
Shadow Catchers (2010) by the Victoria and Albert Museum in London and a book with 
the same title by Martin Barnes, as well as Emanations (2016) by the Govett Brewster 
Art Gallery in New Zealand and the book Emanations by Geoffrey Batchen.  
  Examining these two publications will allow me to discern the trend(s) in 
contemporary camera-less photography, without venturing too much into the 
thoughts of the artists themselves on his or her renunciation of the camera. Although I 
argued before that the maker of a work is always indexically present in his artistic 
product (Hijma 2016), the focus of this thesis is on the general indexical qualities of 
photographic imagery.  
Icon and index  
In order to analyse the way the two case studies I selected relate to the photographic 
index, I want to start by explaining how I will use the terms “icon” and “index” and 
what their function is in reading photographic images. Daniel Chandler’s very clearly 
written Semiotics, the basics will help me plough through the small part I want to 
utilise of the theoretical spider web that is semiotics. In the introduction to his book 
Chandler indicates that semiotics is hard to define and several big names in the field, 
such as Eco, Saussure, Peirce and Jakobson, have formulated what semiotics is in a 
somewhat different way (2-3). In short, Chandler summarizes, semiotics can be 
defined as “the study of signs” (1). 
   In the nineteenth century linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) 
formulated a theory about how we give meaning to the world around us by using the 
term “sign”. This sign is made up out of two parts: the thing that refers meaning to us 
(“signifiant”) and the meaning of that reference (“signifié”) (Chandler 14). In English 
these two components of the sign are mostly referred to as the “signifier” and the 
“signified”. Together these two halves of a circle, as they often are visualized in 
explanations of this theory6, form that which conveys meaning, which communicates. 
Not very much later Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) reworked Saussure’s two part 
sign system into a three part semiotic theory. Peirce still saw the sign as a two-part 
                                                          
6 For an example of such a semiotic circle, see W.J.T. Mitchell’s “Word and Image”, where he explains 
the concept of “tree” by means of such a circle (54).  
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entity, but he distinguished three different categories of signs: the icon, the index and 
the symbol, which differ from each other in the way the signifier relates to the 
signified (Chandler 36-7). If the relationship is based on likeness between the signifier 
and the signified, Peirce calls it an iconic relationship. An example is a portrait: an 
image of someone that is made to give an impression of their appearance. The 
relationship can also be based on proximity of the signified to the signifier, a relation 
based on presence, which can be both spatial and temporal.7 The sign that is 
constructed by such a relationship Peirce calls the index. The example mostly used for 
this sign type is the footprint: it shows that a foot once was at that place (spatial 
proximity), but that is not there anymore (temporal proximity). It shows a trace of the 
foot, the presence of the foot once in this place, but not the foot itself. Finally, the 
relationship between signifier and signified can also be arbitrary, completely based on 
agreement between people, as is the case with the symbol. An example of this is the 
red rose that stands for love: the rose itself does not resemble love or denote the 
proximity of this abstract idea but it stands for love because we as a culture have at 
some point decided that it does. This last category is complicated, because both the 
iconic and indexical relationship can be “proven” to some extent. The symbolic 
relationship, however, is purely based on convention and can therefore work in one 
environment with particular cultural specifics, but does not necessarily have to work in 
the same way in another cultural environment. A red rose might stand for love in the 
West, but is that also a convention in an African tribal society? With the symbol, no 
affinity between signifier and signified needs to exist at all. 
  Daniel Chandler describes signs as “middle men”, which are indispensable in 
order to be able to produce meaning. He argues that meaning is not transmitted one 
way from a transmitting party to a receiving party, but it is an active effort from both 
sides. The receiver has to work in order to “receive” either the likeness, the proximity 
or the agreement (Chandler 11). This idea of active participation by the receiving party 
                                                          
7 The terminology that is used to describe the index is complicated and confusing at times. For example, 
Chandler uses the word “proximity” to indicate the indexical relationship between signifier and signified, 
while others speak of “presence” or “trace”. Eventually all these terms aim to express the same 
relationship, but the words used might make it seem like different things are meant by these scholars. In 
my opinion, this only proves how complicated semiotics can be, especially because we try to talk about 
the production of meaning through a sign system itself: language.  
 13 
  
will return in my argument several times, because the photographic index also relies 
on the action the viewer takes to connect information that is offered to him, be it in 
the image via other sign-types (icons) or via contextual information.  
The conventional photograph: the icon and the index 
To explain how the conventional photograph relates to these semiotic categories of 
icon and index as formulated by Peirce, I want to refer back to the argument of 
Rosalind Krauss that I incorporated in the introduction, that the photograph is as much 
iconic as it is indexical (“Notes” 75). This means that a photograph refers to the visible 
world based on likeness to and physical presence in that world. Philosopher Jonathan 
Friday has therefore labelled photography as “iconically indexical” (343), which bears 
resemblance to the visible word, but also is also “a tracing of patterns of light reflected 
from its object” (343). For the conventional photograph, this reasoning holds up quite 
well. 
  If we envision conventional photography schematically, it would look 
something like this: subject – light source – camera – image (diagram 1). The subject 
reflects light coming from a light source, which is then caught on a photosensitive layer 
in the camera. The light the subject absorbs will not be bounced off the surface and 
will therefore not reach the light sensitive layer. In both the case of a digital and an 
analogue photosensitive layer, this process of “catching” light yields a latent image, 
which has to undergo another process, either the processing of data by a processor in 
a digital camera or the developing and fixing of the image by chemicals when working 
with analogue material. After this second process, which in a sense can both be 
considered as “developing”, an image has been produced. 
  For a photographic image to be created, the subject always has to be present in 
front of the light sensitive layer. This is often claimed to be the difference between 
photography and painting: one can paint an image of an apple by only thinking of an 
apple, but one cannot take a picture of an apple without having an actual apple 
present. As discussed above, the rays of light from a light source “touch” the surface of 
the subject and are registered by the camera. The camera makes use of a lens in order 
to create a sharp image of the subject. Consequently, the subject and the image of the 
subject look alike: the same colours or hues of grey the subject has, are registered by 
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the camera, the same shape and the same shadows. By means of the lens the image is 
in focus, so it is also recognizable as the subject for the viewer.8 The semiotic 
relationship between the subject as the signified and the photograph as the signifier is 
therefore iconic: it is based on similarity.  
  This similarity is produced by the “touching” of the subject by light rays. The 
word “touch” implies a physical relationship between the two. Since the light rays are 
absorbed by the light sensitive surface after they have touched the surface of the 
subject, the physical relationship between the light rays and the subject is then 
transposed into a physical relationship between the subject and the light sensitive 
layer. Thus the relationship between subject and image is also physical, albeit indirect 
(Martino 296). This tangibility of what has been in front of the camera and the 
subsequent image is what makes up the indexical relationship between the two parts 
of the photographic sign: the subject has been there, was present to serve as a 
“model” after which to create an image, not by a painter’s skill, but by a machine’s 
mechanics. This automated way of producing an image is what caused the apparatus 
of photography to become almost synonymous to the medium of photography itself. 
In addition, this mechanical mode of representation together with its indexical relation 
to what it represents are what make up photography’s truth claim. Because what we 
see in the photograph must have been there in front of the camera to be portrayed, 
we generally take what we see to be real. Even though the general audience nowadays 
is getting more accustomed to the manipulability of images, there is still a firm belief in 
the photograph as proof of something. When we want to remember how something 
occurred or convince someone else that something really happened, we take a picture 
as evidence, for our future selves or for others.  
Contiguity 
This truth claim of photography can only withstand criticism if we as viewers put our 
faith in it. In the short article “Carnal Knowledge” (2001) writer and curator Geoffrey 
Batchen discusses this truth claim of photography that is inextricably connected to its 
indexicality, on the basis of the work of two artists in relation to the qualities of touch 
                                                          
8 It must be noted here that it is very well possible to create an out of focus, even highly abstract image 
by means of a camera with a lens. What I speak of here, however, is the regular use of a camera, 
without going into all the artistic possibilities of the apparatus.  
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inherent to photography. He begins this discussion by elaborating on the photographic 
index, proving that the physical relationship a photograph has with its subject does not 
only make the photographic image an indexical sign, it also exemplifies that this 
relationship is physical and the photographic image can therefore make its subject 
“felt” to the viewer.9 Batchen calls this quality “contiguity”: a state of being in contact 
with something (21). “Photographs are primarily designated as indexical signs,” 
Batchen explains, “as images “really affected” by the objects to which they refer” (21) 
he continues citing Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida in passing. Contiguity “is what can 
give any sign in the present a direct association with another sign in the past, and it is 
precisely this temporal and historical connection that provides photography with its 
uniquely “carnal” knowledge of the world” (21). The relation Batchen indicates 
between present and past is strongly related to another concept of Barthes: “temporal 
anteriority”. What the French semiotician means by this is that a photograph always 
shows us something that was. A photograph, after all, is always a delayed image of 
something. There is no such thing as a “direct image” of the here and now, even 
though marketers of instant photography make it seem like there can be. Between the 
moment of registration of a scene (the opening and closing of the shutter) and the 
moment our eyes can view the registration (as a print, negative or on a screen), 
something has to happen to make that image visible. The delay between registration 
and viewing might only be a second, for example on a camera phone, but still the 
image cannot be viewed in the exact same moment as the registration of that 
moment. In the case of analogue photography, this delay is a great deal longer, due to 
all the extra steps that have to be taken to create a viewable image: development, 
fixing, the printing of the negative, and again the development and fixing. The 
contiguity between the subject and the subsequent image therefore only functions 
when the needed knowledge to put the contiguity-link in place is already present in 
the viewer (Batchen 23). As a viewer of a photograph, I cannot make a connection 
between the image and the subject of the image, if I do not know that subject.  
  For abstract photography, to which the camera-less photographic record to 
some extent always belongs, this effort of the viewer to “know” the image is even 
                                                          
9 The idea of making the subject felt to the viewer will come back in my discussion of the case study The 
Day Nobody Died by Broomberg and Chanarin, further on in this chapter.  
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more important, because the images do not offer many iconic referents to assist the 
viewer. Contextual information becomes the key to discerning what the images are 
“about” and put the continuity link in place. This information thus has to be provided 
with the images in the context, be it via an accompanying text in a book, an 
explanatory sign on the wall etcetera.  
  The fact that many artists are emphasizing either a physical or temporal10 
contiguity in their work can be explained, according to Batchen, by a “palpable anxiety 
about contiguity’s future” (22). He blames the digitally rendered photographic image 
for the fear that the relationship between every photograph and its subject will 
disappear, because digital photographs are so easily tampered with, even though 
strictly speaking they still need an indexical relationship with the visible world to be 
created. The digital image is therefore “nothing but surface” (22), Batchen says. 
Contemporary artists who emphasize the physical link between the photograph and 
the visible world foreground the photographic index, proving that for them, as I argue 
here, it is indispensable for the medium.  
  The digital photographic image puts the index under stress. We could say that 
the photographic index of digital photography is the same as with an analogue image. 
The rays of light have bounced of the subject and were caught by a light-sensitive layer 
in the camera. Up until this point in the image-forming process, analogue and digital 
images are produced in the exact same way. However, the analogue light-sensitive 
surface then needs to be developed and fixed in order to result in an observable 
image. Loads of retouching and manipulating can be done during this processing 
phase, but all within the boundaries of the information that is enclosed in the silver 
salts. In the processing of a digital image, manipulation can be done with the 
information enclosed in the image-file, but new image-information can also be 
rendered by software. The digital image is thus in a sense “limitless”, whereas the 
analogue photographic image is always “limited”. In a way, we could say that the 
digitally rendered image loses “touch”, to use a word that screams indexicality, with 
                                                          
10 Of course it can be argued that a temporal relationship is merely a specific version of a physical 
relationship, given that a relationship through time can also be seen as a relationship in space if we 
consider time to be spatial as well, seeing time as a fourth spatial dimension. 
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the visible world. “Contiguity” would therefore become harder to construct for the 
viewer, because everything in an image can refer to both everything and nothing at all.  
Analogue trend 
With this difference in manipulability of analogue and digital images in mind and the 
implications of that difference for the photographic index, it is interesting to note that 
the current camera-less trend also seems to be an analogue trend. In a way, this is not 
surprising. An analogue camera only functions as an image-making apparatus when 
other material is added to it, i.e. film. In the digital camera the light-sensitive layer is 
an integral part of the machine, which cannot be removed without breaking open the 
casing. The digital photosensitive layer is also re-usable countless times. Next to that, 
the analogue material still functions the same way whether it is inside or outside the 
camera. The digital light-sensitive cells need to be hooked up to a processor in order to 
“know” that they have to absorb light at all. Just like film these cells display some form 
of sensitivity to light, but they don’t undergo a permanent physical transformation 
when they absorb light. Analogue material is sensitive to light on its own, chemically 
changing structure when it comes into contact with light.    
  Whereas everyone who wants to try conventional photography will often opt 
for the digital camera because it is cheaper and easily accessible, for a photographer 
who wishes to experiment with camera-less photography working with digital 
equipment is unattractive. As a reaction to the movement among photographers to 
“go” camera-less, a lot of “how-to” books for aspiring artists also have hit the market 
in the last few years.11 Briefly looking through these publications shows that the way 
to go camera-less is to go analogue: fairly easy historical processes you can try at home 
as the cyanotype and the salt print, but also manipulating the more conventional film 
in all kinds of ways.  
  An example of such a camera-less project for which its analogue materiality is 
indispensable will help me demonstrate how the camera-less photographic record is 
almost always also an analogue image. In 2013 Luke Evans and Josh Lake, two young 
artists studying at Kingston University in London, embarked on a journey through the 
                                                          
11 A few examples of such publications are Robert Hirsh’s Photographic Possibilities (1991), Christopher 
James’ The Book of Alternative Photographic Processes (first edition 2007), Malin Fabbri’s Anthotypes 
(2011) and Antonini and others’ Experimental Photography (2015).  
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human body by means of photographic material. Evans and Lake put small pieces of 
film in specially designed capsules and ingested them (Solon). After the capsules left 
their bodies in the natural way, they cleaned the film and put it under a microscope 
(Kelly). This resulted in the project I Turn Myself Inside Out which was acquired by the 
Saatchi Gallery in London after their graduation (figure 9). Had these two young 
photographers decided to do such a project digitally, they might have run into some 
problems. Unless it is in a medical setting, it is never a good idea to swallow small 
machines that use electricity, however small the amount. This would also have made 
the project a lot more expensive, because digital photographic micro equipment is 
very pricey. Analogue film material, on the other hand, is widely available and 
relatively (and I stress that this is only true in this context) cheap. It can also be cut into 
any necessary size very easily and still function in the exact same way, as this project 
by Evans and Lake proves. The “negative” images of their bodies were only very tiny 
pieces of film, but could be enlarged by means of a microscope to form huge prints.  
  I Turn Myself Inside Out is not only of interest to me because it is produced with 
analogue material, but also because of its complicated relationship to the 
photographic index. I have argued before that this project of Luke Evans and Josh Lake 
is an index of its makers, because their bodies do not only function as the subject of 
the images, it is also the means of production (Hijma 40). The indexical relationship 
between the photographers’ bodies and the images is therefore twofold; it is a 
physical relationship between the signifier and the signified by means of the bodily 
fluids that imprinted themselves on the material, an indirect index, but also a direct 
one because of the contact between signifier and signified. I will return to this project 
and its relation to the photographic index in chapter three. 
  If you want to venture into the field of camera-less photography and have a 
basic knowledge of photography and analogue photographic material, there are 
already a great many possible processes and manipulations available. Analogue light-
sensitive material is also “tangible”, another term that heavily hints at indexicality: you 
can take it out of its container and hold it in your hands. This makes it easier to 
envision what kind of things you could try with it and generate ideas as you are 
working. Because the digital photographic image is generated in a machine instead of 
before your eyes, it is harder to get creative with it. The physical relationship between 
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the visible world and the photograph that is foregrounded by the camera-less 
photographic record, which I will go into more in depth later on, seems to be 
strengthened by its analogue nature. The tangibility of the material seems to extend 
itself to the indexical relationship between image and subject, between signifier and 
signified.  
Historical perspective on camera-less photography 
Before I move on to discussing the contemporary camera-less practices, I want to 
briefly go into the history of the photographic mode. This small historical framework 
will make the characteristics of the contemporary camera-less works more clearly 
different from historical camera-less photography. 
  When the medium of photography “saw the light” by the hands of Joseph 
Nicéphore Niépce and Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre in France (Gernsheim and 
Gernsheim 20-21) and simultaneously William Henry Fox Talbot in Britain (Gernsheim 
and Gernsheim 28), photography appeared in two forms. In France the Daguerreotype 
process became very popular, but the process turned out to be short-lived because it 
was not reproducible (Hacking 9-10). This reproducibility of photography is what 
turned out to be its marketability (Benjamin). 
  In Britain, Fox Talbot developed a different photographic procedure based on 
photosensitive salts that he called “photogenic drawings”. The name Fox Talbot gave 
to this mode of production indicates that he saw a close relationship between his new-
found medium by means of a camera obscura and painting, calling them “drawings”. 
However, Fox Talbot mostly used his procedure to make photograms of plants and 
objects, or copies of other images. His most famous photogenic drawings are a part of 
the six instalments of his book titled The Pencil of Nature from the 1840s (Parr and 
Badger 14-15). Fox Talbot’s photograms are the earliest examples of this technique, 
which are also unique, irreproducible pieces. However, the main reason why the 
British scientist chose this way of working is not out of a need for artistic expression as 
is the case with Neusüss, but because his aim was predominantly scientific in nature. 
Fox Talbot saw the photogram technique as most suitable for his effort to create 
accurate representations of fauna, something the cameras that were available to him 
at that time could not achieve. For example, the photogram is a 1:1 scale 
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representation of its subject, offering the viewer precise information about the size 
and shape of the subject of the image.  
  Another publication that is worth mentioning in this context is the first real 
“photobook” by the very first female photographer: Anna Atkins’ Photographs of 
British Algae: Cyanotype Impressions from 1843.12 Atkins made three different versions 
of this book with cyanotype photograms of British algae, of which 17 copies are 
currently known to exist. This book is remarkable because it is the first of its kind: a 
photobook. As in the case of Fox Talbot, Atkins chose to work with the photogram 
technique because her effort was also scientific and her main goal was to transfer 
accurate factual information to the observer of the images (Parr and Badger 20-21). 
The images should offer enough information about the size and shape of the plants to 
discern differences between the various kinds of algae she recorded.  
  Some eighty years later, from around 1920 to 1940, several other artists chose 
the photogram technique, to express their artistic ambitions: among them were László 
Moholgy-Nagy in Germany and Man Ray in France. By then, the photo camera was 
already widely available and could produce very decent quality images. However, 
these two artists deliberately chose not to use it for some of their photographic 
experiments. Moholy-Nagy, who was part of the Bauhaus movement, saw the 
photogram technique as a means to produce a “new vision”: a mechanical imagery 
that was influenced by the hand of the artist as little as possible (Moholy-Nagy, “A New 
Instrument of Vision”, Solomon-Godeau). Man Ray saw the camera as limiting his 
artistic expression, saying that “it has always been a sort of contraceptive preservative 
between my subject and myself” (“A Photographic Biography” 175).  
  Writer and critic Lyle Rexer in his publication on abstraction in photography 
titled The Edge of Vision. The Rise of Abstraction in Photography writes that “Man Ray 
on the one hand and Moholy-Nagy on the other sought to realign photography with 
freer and more open ways of representing than a strictly documentary system could 
accommodate. They did it by reconsidering what a photograph means (Man Ray) and 
what it is (Moholy-Nagy)” (Rexer 68). In other words, Man Ray renounced the camera 
so the apparatus could not overshadow his search for meaning, the semiotic value of a 
                                                          
12 In May 2017 the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam acquired a copy of this infamous photobook, which is 
currently part of the exhibition “New Realities. Photography in the Nineteenth Century”.  
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photograph. Moholy-Nagy on the other hand questioned the ontological value of a 
photograph by eliminating the camera from his artistic process.  
  Even though the reasons why these photographers I briefly discussed did not 
work with a camera are different, either because the photogram offers factual 
information the photograph cannot or because the artist wanted to eliminate any 
visible marks of authorship from the production process, contemporary camera-less 
photography like Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme and Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day 
Nobody Died is produced in this fashion for very different reasons.  
Contemporary camera-less photography 
To demonstrate what differentiates current camera-less photography from the 
historical examples I just considered, I want to discuss two recent exhibitions and 
accompanying publications. First I want to discuss Shadow Catchers: Camera-less 
Photography, an exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum South Kensington from 
October 13, 2010 until February 20, 2011 and the eponymous book, edited by the 
Senior Curator of Photography at the V&A, Martin Barnes. In this exhibition five artists 
were given a platform to display the work they made without the use of a camera to a 
fairly large audience. The artists, Floris Neusüss, Pierre Cordier, Susan Derges, Gary 
Fabian Miller and Adam Fuss, have all worked with a camera at some point in their 
lives, but for their best known work they have all renounced the apparatus. As I was 
not able to see the exhibition myself at the time it was on display at the V&A, I will 
mainly refer to the accompanying publication in the following examination. 
  Shadow Catchers’ publication starts off with a short introduction by way of a 
historical overview of the camera-less photographic practice written by Barnes. The 
aim of Barnes’ historical background is similar to mine: to offer the reader some 
perspective for the contemporary camera-less works that follow. The introduction by 
Barnes is followed by a section on each of the five artists, first offering an essay about 
their life and work and ending with an extensive selection of images from different 
projects. The fact that a large amount of the pages of this publication are filled with 
only images shows that the aim of this exhibition and accompanying publication is to 
present these artists, who are made synecdochical for the contemporary camera-less 
trend. 
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  Reading these entries on five different photographers and looking at the 
accompanying examples of their work (figures 1-5), an interesting analysis of 
characteristics of the contemporary camera-less record can be made. First, there is the 
size of camera-less images. In the case of photograms, the images are a full size 
representation of its subject, which is exploited in the Körperfotogramme by Floris 
Neusüss (Barnes 26, figure 1). Susan Derges, on the other hand, explores both large 
and small scale possibilities of the photogram technique (97, figure 2). This is 
connected to a second characteristic: the different perspective camera-less 
photographs offer. The depicted subjects seem to float in space, whether they touch 
the photographic surface, as in the work of Neusüss (27) or not, as in the work of Garry 
Fabian Miller (129, figure 3), without a horizon, as in the work of Neusüss (26, 28), 
Derges (97) and Fuss (167, figure 4). A third characteristic is that most camera-less 
photographs are unique pieces. The artists wish to explore the physical (128) and 
technical (26, 95) possibilities of the photogram technique causing the viewer to 
wonder how these images were created, as in the work of Cordier (62, figure 5) and 
Fuss (164). Finally, the last quality specific of these artists’ work that is addressed in 
Shadow Catchers is the relation with the human (un)conscious. Derges examines the 
line between inner and outer expression in her work (Barnes 98), looking for “the link 
between the physical world and the psyche” (98). Neusüss also seeks to express part of 
the human unconscious (27), as Gary Fabian Miller aims to explore the “dark space of 
the mind” (130) and Adam Fuss the “existence of our inner shadow” (168). Artistic 
production is therefore linked to natural phenomena by these artists, although for 
Pierre Cordier craftsmanship of the artist is the key of his works (61) with “varying 
degrees of chance and control” (64), whereas Fuss opts for a “minimal intervention of 
the artist’s hand” (164). 
  The second exhibition and accompanying publication I want to discuss is 
Emanations: The Art of the Cameraless Photograph, an exhibition at the Govett 
Brewster Art Gallery in New Zealand from April until August 2016 and the book of the 
same name. It is striking to see that this exhibition took place on the southern 
hemisphere, but word of it and the publication reached the Western art world 
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quickly.13  
  Whereas Shadow Catchers focused on the works of five specific photographers 
working without a camera, Emanations offers a more general and historically 
embedded perspective on this photographic practice. As the exhibition announcement 
endorses: “We present the most complete study of camera-less photography to date, 
focusing on the cameraless mode from the 1830s through to today and offering a 
global perspective on this way of working” (website Govett Brewster Art Gallery, 
emphasis added). The aim of Emanations is not only to give a historical overview of 
photography produced without a camera, it also sets out to offer a global perspective 
on the practice, which I cannot go into within the confines of this thesis. I emphasized 
the word “mode” in the citation, because I feel it says a great deal about the place of 
camera-less photography in today’s photographic discourse. The use of this word 
shows that the curators of the exhibition are aware that camera-less photography is 
not a short-lived trend in contemporary image-making that will disappear again soon. 
It has always been there next to the conventional way of making photographic images 
and just after photography’s “birth” in the 1830s this mode was the only possible 
method, as my short historical framework also showed.14 
  The other aspect of Emanations that sets it apart from Shadow Catchers is the 
focus on the historical, rather than contemporary perspective. As Batchen explains, 
and Lyle Rexer endorses this in The Edge of Vision, the camera-less photograph has 
been ignored in histories of photography. Batchen therefore sets out to write a history 
of solely camera-less photography in this book, being as inclusive as he can by also 
addressing artists from all over the world. Generally a history of photography starts 
out with camera-less examples, such as Fox Talbot’s “photogenic drawings”, but moves 
on to imagery produced by means of a camera as soon as a proper version was 
                                                          
13 Only weeks after the exhibition opened, I ran into the publication at the shop of the Nederlands 
Fotomuseum in Rotterdam. Even though most of the museum’s visitors probably would not have been 
able to see the exhibition, the museum still found the publication worthy of a place in their shop. 
Obviously they feel the camera-less photographic record is of interest to the general photography-loving 
public that visits such a museum in this day and age.  
14 Granted, the camera-less photographic record was the mainstream mode in the 1820s to 1840s 
mostly because of technical restrictions to the photographic medium. As soon as superior quality images 
could be made (by the use of a lens, and therefore a camera ”box”), the camera-less photograph fell 
into abeyance quickly. But this way of producing images has never disappeared completely and has also 
undergone technological developments alongside those in conventional photography, making the term 
“mode” very suitable.  
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created. Even the word I use myself, “camera-less” photography, implies a strong 
relationship with the apparatus that is often confused with the medium of 
photography: the camera.  
Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme and the photographic index 
Floris Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme are, as the title gives away, photograms of bodies: 
human bodies to be more precise. In short, the photogram technique entails putting 
an object onto a photosensitive surface in the dark and exposing it to light. This yields 
an image of the outline of the object that was placed on the light sensitive layer, a 
shadow if you will. The surface of the object blocks the rays of light from reaching the 
paper, but also blocks them from bouncing of the surface of the object onto the paper. 
Consequently, no information about the surface of the object is included in the 
subsequent image, which is therefore abstracted. Note that this technique does not 
involve any photographic apparatus: no camera or lens is used to create the image. 
  Another characteristic of the photogram, as I have also pointed out in the 
analysis of Shadow Catchers, is that the image is a life-size representation of the 
subject. In this case, the image Neusüss created is as large as a human laying down in a 
foetal position, namely 130 centimetres by 58 centimetres (Barnes 32). 
  An example is Neusüss’ untitled photogram from 1962 (figure 1), which shows 
what such a bodily photogram looks like. The image shows an outline of a human body 
in black and different gradations of grey, but no colour. The background of the image is 
almost white, whereas the figure is dark grey to black. From top to bottom there are a 
few elements we can discern as human: strands of hair on the head, a vague outline of 
a nose on the left just below that, a few fingers on the left of the body, two knees just 
below those fingers and toes on the very bottom of the figure. By means of all this 
information we can conclude that this is a human figure, most likely female because of 
the hair style, but too little information is provided by the image to be certain. The 
pose of the figure is a foetal position, with knees bent up and arms tucked underneath 
the body, the body itself turned on its side. On the surface of the shadow of this figure 
we see various gradations of grey, indicating that some light was allowed to enter 
between the body and the photographic paper. This proves that the subject was 
physically present on the photosensitive surface, blocking the light in certain places. 
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The indexical presence is therefore very strong in this image, as we can see in the 
image that the signified even literally touched the signifier. The surface also seems a 
little bit wrinkled, which is another indicator of the signified that touched the signifier: 
the person that laid down on the paper before exposure. 
  Neusüss’ Körperfotogramm thus lacks some iconic information to make this 
image a proper portrait of someone, but the technique that was used does make the 
presence of the represented more easily felt for the viewer. In comparison to 
conventional photography this is image therefore less iconic and more indexical.  
Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died and the photographic index 
The camera-less images of the project The Day Nobody Died by Adam Broomberg and 
Oliver Chanarin are created by exposing a light sensitive surface to light, without use of 
either a camera or lens and without putting the subject directly upon the light sensitive 
surface. The results are therefore completely abstract images, sometimes containing 
some shadowy shapes, but never recognizable as an object or scene (figures 6 and 7). 
Broomberg and Chanarin took a big roll of photographic paper with them when they 
accompanied a group of British soldiers to Afghanistan. On the scene, they rolled out a 
piece of the paper each time and exposed it to the things they witnessed. Because 
these images are all unique pieces of which the paper print is the only copy, the size of 
the images is determined by the size of the piece of paper they cut off, six meters at a 
time. 
  Nothing of the scenes these two artists witnessed when they rolled out the 
photographic paper can be recognized in the images, but by means of contextual 
information we know that it was present, mainly by means of the artists’ manifesto. 
The titles the artists gave to the images give us a more specific idea of what that 
particular image represents, for example “The Day of One Hundred Dead, June 8, 
2008” (figure 7). The title tells us that this image witnessed a hundred people die. It 
was physically in front of the atrocities and has absorbed the rays of light that were 
reflected by the events that took place. The photographic index is therefore very 
strong in these images, because the iconic has given out completely. We cannot 
recognize what these images claim to represent, we can only feel their presence in 
front of it. These representations are the most literal examples of Damisch’ definition 
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of photography, which I already briefly discussed in the Introduction: “a process of 
recording, a technique of inscribing, in an emulsion of silver salts, a stable image 
generated by a ray of light” (287). They are nothing other than an inscription in silver 
salts, because they do not refer to anything iconically anymore. Their “pointing” 
function that is a product of their indexicality is therefore all the more important. 
These images tell us what events demand attention, without letting us get lost in the 
iconic details.  
  Nevertheless, without an explanation of what these images “represent”, these 
photographs would have no value as a representation of conflict at all. They would 
simply be colourful planes, which refer to nothing outside of themselves. These 
photographic pointers thus do not function as such without the proper contextual 
information, something I will explore further in the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
This first chapter laid down the foundation for me to build on in the following 
chapters. First I discussed the terms “icon” and “index” as formulated by Charles 
Sanders Peirce, to explicate how I will be using these semiotic terms throughout this 
thesis. Next, I briefly discussed how the photographic index and icon generally function 
in relation to the conventional photograph, in order to be able to compare the 
differences with camera-less photographic images in the following chapter. 
  Following this groundwork, I analysed some of the characteristics of 
contemporary camera-less photography by means of the exhibitions and 
accompanying publications Shadow Catchers (2010) and Emanations (2016). The five 
photographers that are given a platform in Shadow Catchers all seek to explore the 
possibilities of the camera-less mode, in order to express something from inside the 
human psyche that a figurative, conventional image could not. The uniqueness of the 
images is another characteristic that is investigated by these artists. Batchen’s 
Emanations offers a historical perspective on camera-less photography, showing that 
this mode of image-making has always been practiced in the history of photography. 
  Lastly, the camera-less trend is analogue in nature, because this material is 
easily used outside the camera and widely available. Analogue material makes it easier 
for aspiring camera-less artists to try it. In some cases, as my discussion of Evans and 
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Lake’s photographic project I Turn Myself Inside Out has pointed out, going digital isn’t 
an option at all. This fight between analogue and digital is an issue nowadays, of 
course, because we have both technologies readily available.  
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Chapter 2 
The camera-less photograph and the icon and the index 
 
Introduction  
In the first chapter I laid down the groundwork to analyse the camera-less 
photographic record in relation to the index. Elaborating on the semiotic terms “icon” 
and “index”, as well as discussing the contemporary photographic discourse on 
camera-less photography gives me the opportunity to discuss camera-less 
photography and the photographic index more in depth in this following chapter. This 
second chapter will answer the question how the relation of contemporary camera-
less photography with the index and the icon differs from the way the conventional 
photograph relates to it, foregrounding the photographic index in the process. To 
answer this question, however, it is useful to first discuss some seminal texts on 
photography theory concerning the photographic index.  
  First, I want to examine the photograph as a sign, discussing theories on 
photography by Rosalind Krauss, Tom Gunning and returning once again to Roland 
Barthes. Krauss is of the opinion that the photograph is equally iconic and indexical, 
thereby showing the relevance of these two terms for the production of meaning in 
photography already indicated by Peirce himself (Collected Papers 2.286).  Tom 
Gunning is one of the scholars that reacts to Krauss’ statement by dismissing the 
photographic index and arguing for a phenomenological approach. It is through his 
critique that I can prove that, even though he tries to get rid of the photographic index 
in theorizing the meaning of photographs, he actually reinforces it.  
  Additionally, I want to take some more time to discuss the quite radical, and 
also changing, ideas of Roland Barthes on photography. Even though he is a 
semiotician himself, Barthes once claimed that the photograph is an un-coded 
message, only to later revise his own ideas and turning more in the direction of the 
indexical with his concepts of “studium” and “punctum”.  
  To close my discussion of the index and the icon in photography theory, I will 
discuss a short article by Mary Ann Doane on the index, who bases her argument on 
the ideas of Rosalind Krauss, but makes a distinction between two types of indices that 
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is pivotal for my argument. Then I will relate these two types of indices again to 
Geoffrey Batchen’s concept “contiguity”.  
  Finally, I want to relate my two case studies, as well as the two different kinds 
of camera-less photography they belong to, to the photographic index. My two case 
studies, Floris Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme and Adam Broomberg and Oliver 
Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died, differ from each other in the degree of iconicity they 
possess and the type of photographic index they foreground. I will therefore first 
discuss them separately and analyse their specific relation to the icon and the index. 
Subsequently, I will compare the results of these analyses and explicate the 
implications of the similarities and differences.   
The index in photographic discourse 
When we consider the entirety of a photograph as a sign, the iconic and indexical are 
the most relevant categories to discuss the way it produces meaning. Elements in the 
diegetic world15 of the photograph can of course refer to a signified symbolically, but 
the photograph as an object will mostly be considered in terms of likeness to its 
subject and presence of that which it shows.  
  In the two articles “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America”, art historian 
Rosalind Krauss argues that every photograph is “a type of icon, or visual likeness, 
which bears an indexical relation to its object” (“Notes” 75). According to her theory, if 
we were to create a spectrum from the icon on the left to the index on the right, the 
photograph would have to be placed exactly in the middle; it refers to what it shows in 
an iconic way, but it also has a physical relationship with that scene. This way, Krauss 
argues, “the photograph heralds a disruption of the autonomy of the sign” (“Notes” 
77), because it does not refer to the visible world as one type of sign. She adopts the 
definition of the index given by Peirce that the index is a physical trace of something16, 
but she adds to this the concept of “shifters” (“Notes” 69-70), a concept first 
formulated by linguist Roman Jakobson. The “shifter” is a sign that is empty in itself 
                                                          
15 The term “diegesis” is often used in literary theory, denoting the spatio-temporal universe in which a 
story takes place, which is separate from “our” world: the world of the author (Herman and Vervaeck 
87-98). In the case of the photograph, we could see the separate spatio-temporal world depicted in a 
photograph as a diegetic world in itself as well.  
16 It might come across here as if Peirce claimed that a sign is either a symbol, index or an icon, but this 
is actually not the case. Peirce himself also stated that a sign, the photograph in particular, is a mix of 
different types of signs, never solely the one of the other (Collected Papers 2.281). 
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and only gains meaning in context. It can therefore have several different meanings in 
different settings, hence the term “shifter”. An example of a “shifter” is a personal 
pronoun such as “you”, which indicates the person that “I” addresses as “you” and can 
shift content in a conversation with several people numerous times. The index, Krauss 
continues, is always empty like these “shifters” and needs to be filled with a 
“presence”: “the implication is that there is no convention for meaning independent of 
or apart from that presence” (“Notes” 80). The proximity that the indexical quality of 
photography guarantees, is also where the production of meaning starts. 
  The conclusion could therefore be, bringing my argument to an early close, that 
the index is indispensable for the production of meaning in photography. However, 
this would be too easy. In the decades after Krauss wrote these articles, many scholars 
argued against the index as the determining factor of photographic meaning, or even 
against the use of this term itself. One of those critics is Professor of Art History and 
Media Studies Tom Gunning, who in his article “What’s the Point of an Index? or, 
Faking Photographs” (2004) argues against the index and in favour of the emotional 
response someone has when looking at a photograph. Photographs, he says, “are 
more than just pictures” (Gunning 46). They make us think of something beyond the 
surface of the image, imagine what is behind it, or, in other words, what was once 
before it. This view on photography is again relatable to Barthes’ idea of “temporal 
anteriority”, which seems to return in every discussion of the photographic index, even 
though not always in these terms. Gunning’s view is different from the semiotic 
approach, he explains, because the reading of a photograph in terms of signs reduces 
the reference to signification. Gunning sees the “passageway” (46) a photograph 
opens up not as a route to signification, but as an entrance to a whole world beyond 
the surface.17 He therefore argues against the indexical claim of photography, because 
the index “falls entirely into the rational realm” (Gunning 46). He paraphrases both 
renowned French film critic André Bazin18 and Roland Barthes in their claim that no 
                                                          
17 This idea of a photograph as a passage to a whole other world refers back to the earlier discussed 
literary term “diegesis”.  
18 In his seminal essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” (1945) André Bazin explains that 
photographs present themselves as objective and real, but this is only an effect of their mechanical 
means of production. The photograph is therefore no substitute for reality, because it becomes 
separated from it.    
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photograph is ever fully a substitute for that which it depicts, although all signs 
function as substitutions of the referred (Gunning 47). Gunning continues to state that 
photographs resist significance because they also show “noise” (47): elements that 
cannot be explained as signs, but are still there in the picture. Unfortunately, Gunning 
neglects to provide any clear examples. 
   This “noise” is the reason Gunning wants a phenomenological approach of the 
experience of photographs instead of a semiotic one. To build his argument on this 
after devoting eight pages of his ten page article to the truth claim and use of the 
index seems confusing, if not contradictory to his point. Adding to that, it is easy to 
argue that the superfluous elements in a photograph Gunning calls insignificant 
“noise” can all also be read as signs, as denoting something, since it is there in the 
image. An element cannot be present in the image if it has not been in front of the 
camera, if it was not present to be reproduced by light in an emulsion of silver salts. So 
in a sense, every element in a photograph is an indexical sign.  
  This “there”-ness is very important in the discussion of indexicality in 
photography, both for and against it, as my discussion of Gunning showed. I agree with 
Gunning that a photograph can have something present in it that catches your 
attention and makes you feel something. I also agree that this “something” is not 
always easily definable as a sign, because it is not always a particular element in the 
photograph that stirs you this way. However, I do not agree that this eliminates the 
index as the “locus” of meaning. On the contrary, I feel the indexical quality of 
photography is exactly what produces this “hit”. 
  When I say things like “hit”, “something that touches you” and “something that 
evokes emotion”, it rings a Barthesian bell. In his posthumously published book 
Camera Lucida (1980) semiotician Roland Barthes coins two concepts in relation to 
photography: the “studium” (26) and the “punctum” (27). The “studium” consists of 
the rational connotations you have with certain photographs: “What I feel about these 
photographs,” Barthes states, “derives from an average effect, almost from a certain 
training” (26, emphasis in original). Barthes goes on to say that the “studium” is “a kind 
of general enthusiastic commitment […] without special acuity” (26). This is a category 
of images that we might find pleasing to look at, but are not necessarily invested in 
emotionally. The “punctum”, on the other hand, is harder to define, because it refers 
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to the indescribable reaction we have to certain photographs. Many people can see a 
“studium” photograph almost in the same way because the “studium” is, as Barthes 
said, (culturally) trained. The “punctum” is “the element which rises from the scene, 
shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (26) Barthes explains. It is a sensitive 
point, a sting, “that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)” 
(27, brackets in original); it is a detail (43) and it evokes an emotional reaction in the 
viewer before he has the chance to apply the “acquired” “studium”.  
  The relation between signifier and signified in the photographic message, be it 
either as “studium” or “punctum”, is quasi-tautological according to Barthes. In 
another essay he wrote before Camera Lucida titled “The Photographic Message” 
(1977), Barthes claims that the photograph is a message (194), but it is un-coded (196). 
This claim shows that Barthes later changed positions on the relevance of the 
photographic index, when he revoked this idea of the un-coded photograph during the 
writing of Camera Lucida (especially in the second part). In the case of an un-coded 
photograph, Barthes claims, the signifier and signified would therefore be the exact 
same thing, making the photograph as a sign tautological. The photograph shows, but 
in order for what it shows to be signs, Barthes says, it has to be described and to 
describe an image you need words: language, a wholly separate symbolic sign system 
(198). Therefore the photograph is purely “denotative” (198): it is a perfect analogy of 
reality (196), but it does not “connote” (197) anything itself. Here I feel Barthes gets 
trapped in his own reasoning, because he also argues the following:  
  The photograph professing to be a mechanical analogue of reality, its first-order  
  message in some sort completely fills its substance and leaves no place for the  
  development of a second-order message. Of all the structures of information, the  
  photograph appears as the only one that is exclusively constituted and occupied by a  
  “denoted” message, a message which totally exhausts its mode of existence. (197)  
How can a photograph be un-coded if it has a first-order message, a message being a 
form of communication and communication being impossible without signs? This 
message might be only denotative in a photograph, but it is still communication, 
sending something out for someone to receive, through a “channel of transmission” 
(Barthes 194). Barthes even continues his argument saying that “in photography […] 
there is never art but always meaning” (203, emphasis in original). How can this 
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meaning be produced if the photograph is an un-coded entity that cannot be dealt 
with except with other sign-systems? Barthes completely overlooks the fact that a 
photograph can send a message just by being what it is: a demarcated field of visual 
information, right there for the looking-at.   
  Even though Gunning and to some extent Barthes make it seem that the 
indexical and the emotional are mutually exclusive, this is not necessarily the case: the 
index can evoke an emotional reaction to an image precisely because of the 
“presence” the photographical index ensures. The world-famous but never seen 
“Winter garden photograph” Barthes talks about in Camera Lucida, a picture of his 
deceased mother (67), proves this point, even though Barthes himself does not give 
the index credit. Barthes explains his “punctum” on the basis of this photograph, which 
somehow stung him more than any other photograph ever did. In my view, it is exactly 
the fact that he knew that his mother stood in front of a camera this way, looked into 
the lens, that touches him. What Barthes recognizes in this photograph is the essence 
of his mother, even though he never saw her at this age. So it is not a specific element 
of the picture that makes it indexical for his mother’s being, but the image as a whole. 
Her presence in front of the camera at the moment of production is what makes him 
emotionally affected by the image. A painting made of such an occasion would never 
have the same power, because we do not believe every painting to be a veritable 
representation of that which is depicted on it (Bolter and Grusin 30). As Gunning 
asserts in his discussion of the truth claim of the photograph, the contemporary viewer 
still believes that the photograph has truth value, even if he knows how malleable an 
image is (40-41), thereby returning to the position Rosalind Krauss takes in the two 
articles she wrote on the index:  
  [T]he support for the index could obviously take any configuration, two- or three- 
  dimensional […] Yet even as that presence surfaces, it fills the work with an  
  extraordinary sense of time-past. Though they are produced by a physical cause, the  
  trace, the impression, the clue, are vestiges of that cause which is itself no longer  
  present in the given sign [...] the paradox of being physically present but temporally  
  remote. (65) 
This citation from Krauss’ “Notes, Part 2” reminds us again of Roland Barthes’ concept 
of “spatial immediacy” and “temporal anteriority”, only phrased slightly differently. 
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The photograph asserts a “having-been-there”, having been physically present at the 
moment of creation and therefore being an indexical sign par excellence, which 
“satisfies questions of verifiability at the level of the document” (“Notes, Part 2” 66) 
according to Krauss. The “spatial immediacy” of photography strengthens its claim to 
being a document of truth, as a matter of “evidence, rather than a function of logic” 
(Krauss, “Notes, Part 2” 66). According to Krauss, the observer of photography does 
not believe in its truth based on rationality, but because he is programmed to believe a 
photograph as evidence of a scene. The indexical therefore evokes the emotional, 
because we believe what we see to be real, truth, to have-been (Barthes, Camera 
Lucida 77).  
Two types of photographic indices 
In a way, the discussion of Krauss, Gunning and Barthes has already provided me with 
two positions in relation to the index. Whereas Krauss deemed the index to be shifting, 
Gunning argued the sign type to be full of insignificant noise. In the short article 
“Indexicality: Trace and Sign: Introduction” (2007) Professor in Film and Media Studies 
Mary Ann Doane discusses both these positions and shows that it is possible for both 
the full and the empty index to co-exist. Doane’s introduction to an entire issue of a 
journal devoted to the index shows that the authors included in it want to re-examine 
the viability of the index “as a concept, an expectation, and a crucial cultural and 
semiotic force” (6, emphasis in original). In short, according to these authors the 
indexical qualities of film and photography matter. Doane follows Krauss in her 
introduction on the index, when she explains that the index seems to either “harbor a 
fullness, an excessiveness of detail” (2) or it “implies an emptiness, a hollowness that 
can only be filled in specific, contingent, always mutating situations” (2) as is the case 
when we speak of the index as “deixis”.  
  “Deixis” refers to words that are completely meaningless in itself, but gain 
content by the context in which they are used (Bal 30, Hesselberth). Examples of such 
words are “here”, “there”, “me” and “you”. This idea of the index as “deixis” is 
basically a reworded version of Rosalind Krauss’ concept of “shifters”. This closeness of 
the index to its objects, Doane argues, even raises questions as to whether the index is 
a sign-type at all; as I already pointed out when I discussed Barthes’ concept of an un-
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coded photographic message, in theory everything can refer to something indexically, 
by being present. However, as Doane indicates, there is no difference between index-
as-trace and “shifters” in Krauss’ argument, making all types of indices “the sheer 
affirmation of an existence, the emptiness of a “meaningless meaning”” (3). The quote 
by Peirce that Doane starts her introduction with is becoming in this context: “The 
index asserts nothing; it only says “There!”” (1).  
  The question is, however, if the emptiness of the index also makes it devoid of 
meaning. Doane disagrees when she states that it is precisely the deictic quality of the 
photographic index which makes it crucial “when attempting to deal with the 
saturation of images characterizing contemporary culture. […] To take up the index 
today, as a theoretical concept, is to insist that the complexities of the issue of 
referentiality should not deter us from investigating and analysing its force” (5). So the 
force of reference is still very much there and the index is pre-eminently the concept 
to analyse this force. 
  Thus the power of the index lies in its paradoxical content: the index is both full 
of signification but at the same time empty of reference without context. The key to 
either create a hierarchy in this plethora of signs or fill the emptiness lies in the 
interpreter of the index: the viewer. It is the “reader” of the image who has to 
recognize the signs communicated by the image and translate them into meaning, be it 
iconic, indexical or symbolic. In the case of the photograph, as said, this deciphering 
will mainly be focused on the iconic at first: what I can see and what it resembles to 
me. Another thing the photograph asserts, however, is the presence of that thing the 
viewer recognizes: it has been in front of the camera. This makes the object of a 
photograph, as Roland Barthes puts it in “Rhetoric of the Image” (1964, even before 
“The Photographic Message”), subject to both “spatial immediacy”, it is here in front 
of us to see, and “temporal anteriority”, the object itself is not here now but it once 
was in the presence of this light sensitive layer (159). Without someone to 
communicate to, these messages would all be sent but never received. In other words, 
these signs would not be signs at all.  
  Signification needs an interpreter, someone who connects the dots, if you will. 
This is where Geoffrey Batchen’s concept “contiguity” comes into play once again. 
Batchen stresses that contiguity, the state of being in contact with something (“Carnal 
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Knowledge” 21), only works when the viewer of an image has the knowledge to 
connect what he sees to what it represents. If the required knowledge is not already 
present in the viewer, the link will not be made and the indexical sign does not 
function. Contiguity is “what can give any sign in the present a direct association with 
another sign in the past” (21) according to Batchen, a viewpoint seemingly displaying 
similarities to Barthes’ ideas of “spatial immediacy” and “temporal anteriority”. 
Batchen continues that “it is precisely this temporal and historical connection that 
provides photography with its uniquely “carnal” knowledge of the world” (21). In other 
words, the indexical connection of the photograph to its subject, both physically and 
temporally, is what makes the photographic sign so “carnal”: “relating to physical, 
especially sexual, needs and activities” (Google Translate) or “relating to sex or 
someone’s body” (Longman Dictionary). According to Batchen the relationship 
between the photographic image and the world it portrays is so intensely physical, that 
it is like love-making.  
  The other side of the paradox, the emptiness of the index, relies just as much 
on the reader of the image. The deictic index can only have meaning when it is used in 
a certain context. In other words, the index as “deixis” is filled by information outside 
of the sign itself. It is again the viewer who has to make this connection between the 
sign and the context that provides the sign with its signified. Thus in the case of the 
deictic indexical image, as in the case of the “noisy” index, the “contiguity” only works 
if the viewer has the required knowledge to relate these two parts of the deictic index.  
Körperfotogramme and the iconic and the indexical 
The photogram differs from the conventional photograph in the way the signifier, the 
image, and the signified, the “stamped” object, are connected. Whereas the 
conventional photograph is both iconic and indexical, the latter reinforced or “filled” 
by the former, a photogram of an object is abstracted from its appearance in the 
visible world. This abstractedness also involves a proportionally different relation to 
both icon and index, because abstraction also implies diminished iconicity; there is less 
to recognize and more relations have to be made by means of the observer’s frame of 
reference. Let me explain this using Floris Neusüss’ Körperfotogramm “Untitled” from 
1962 (figure 1).  
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  Were this a conventional photograph of a person, then we would in general be 
able to see what the person looks like, what facial features he or she has and what 
kind of clothes he or she is wearing. In other words, if this was a conventional 
photograph, we would first and foremost discern the iconic qualities of the image in 
order to give meaning to it. By means of the photogram, however, most of this iconic 
information about the portrayed object has been eliminated. The photogram is 
therefore less iconic than the conventional photograph, because the relation between 
signifier and signified is based less on “likeness”. But the likeness between object and 
representation has not been completely abandoned. As my reading of the image in the 
previous chapter has proven, it is still possible to gain information about what we are 
looking at based on elements in the image that demonstrate a similarity to things we 
know. 
  However, the information supplied by the iconic elements of the image is not 
very comprehensive in Neusüss’ untitled Körperfotogramm; there is a certain likeness 
between signifier and signified, but not enough information is given to consider this 
image to be an icon of the portrayed person. Because the image is less iconic than a 
conventional photograph, there is room for other readings than those based on 
likeness. This shift from the overbearing icon to other possibilities is due to the higher 
degree of abstraction present in images produced by the photogram technique. The 
abstracted image makes the subject of the image more pronounced, which we can 
only barely discern to be a human being.  
  The subject of this image should be such a familiar shape to us, a human body, 
but still it looks otherworldly when portrayed in this manner. The indexical claim of the 
image, that this person has really been “present’ on the photographic paper, is 
amplified by the fact that we cannot get “lost” in iconic details about the “surface” of 
the individual. In a sense, this figure does not become an individual at all because of 
the lack of surface-information, but remains a shape, a form. To return to Batchen’s 
concept of “contiguity”, by means of the little iconic referents we see in this image we 
can make an indexical connection between the photogram and its subject. The physical 
relationship is even more prominent in this case, because the iconic does not offer that 
much support to distil meaning from this image. It is the “contiguity”, the state of 
being in the presence of this body, which makes this representation of the human 
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body interesting. Due to the abstraction present in this photogram, a consequence of 
its mode of production, the photographic index takes over from the icon to guide the 
reading of the image.  
The Day Nobody Died and the iconic and the indexical 
In the case of the camera-less photographic record that is not produced as a 
photogram, in other words, one that is not an image of a “stamped” object on a 
photosensitive surface, the icon as the determining factor for the production of 
meaning is pushed to the background even further. These images consist of 
photographic material that is simply exposed to light by taking it out of a light-proof 
environment. The series The Day Nobody Died was created like this. Where this kind of 
images is concerned, the influence of context on photographic “contiguity” is of 
paramount importance. Whereas the photogram moves away from the iconic and 
more in the direction of the index as the determining factor of the production of 
meaning, the camera-less photographic record does away with iconic relations 
entirely. The only value these images have, is therefore encapsulated in their indexical 
properties. As can be seen in the images from Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day 
Nobody Died (figure 6 and 7), these images do not refer to anything in the visible 
world based on a likeness to it, except for colour. This abstraction causes the viewer to 
look for other ways to interpret the image: if we cannot see what it shows, maybe we 
can then somehow find out what it represents. This is where the context comes into 
play. The context offers the viewer information which he or she can use to fill in the 
index, which is empty in itself. Rosalind Krauss calls this process “the addition of an 
articulated discourse, or text, to the otherwise mute index” (“Notes, Part 2” 66). 
  The very fact that we know that these images from Broomberg and Chanarin’s 
project represent a war zone in Afghanistan is only because of external, contextual 
information that is provided with the project (the artists’ manifesto, the video of the 
box). The indexical qualities of these images assert that the sheets of photosensitive 
paper were there in this region, among the members of the British army units. These 
photographs are therefore text-book examples of Barthes’ concept of “spatial 
immediacy” in photography, but only because we know these sheets of photographic 
paper to have been in the presence of their supposed subject. The image “The Press 
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Conference” (figure 6) shows that it has-been-there (Barthes 76) in front of a press 
conference, but it does not depict this subject. It only conveys its essence by 
representing it indexically. The index is therefore leading in the production of meaning 
of these images, but has to be supported from the outside. The camera-less 
photographic record privileges the index over the icon, but the index cannot sustain 
itself without external reinforcement. We would not be able to tell if these images 
either represented a war zone or a teddy bear if the contextual information provided 
by the two artists did not accompany the images.   
Conclusion 
In the photographic discourse scholars have argued in favour of as well as against the 
index as the determining factor in the production of meaning in photography. Rosalind 
Krauss argues that the photographic index is equally important for the interpretation 
of images as the icon is. She states that the index is an empty sign-type, which can shift 
in meaning when framed in another context.  
  Others such as Tom Gunning are of the opinion that the index should be 
disregarded when judging photographs because it is only insignificant “noise”, arguing 
that the emotional response an observer has should be leading in all efforts of 
interpretation. In other words, the emotional should triumph over the rational. 
However, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, the 
emotional response we have to certain photographs can be considered as indices 
themselves, since it is something present in the image which stings us, to use Roland 
Barthes’ words. 
  From these different positions, two types of photographic indices can be 
discerned: the full “noisy” index Gunning discusses and the empty shifting index Krauss 
elaborates on. Mary Ann Doane proves that these two types can exist next to each 
other and images can refer to something in both these ways. In the third and final 
chapter I will go into these two types of indices in relation to my two case studies in 
more detail.  
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Chapter three 
Index as trace and index as deixis 
 
Introduction 
In this final chapter I want to go further into the problematic relationship between the 
photographic index and the camera-less photograph. As the discussion of Neusüss’ 
Körperfotogramme and Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died has pointed 
out in relation to the index and the icon in the previous chapter, the camera-less 
photographic record has a strong connection to the index, because of the diminished 
figuration. It seems that the further the image moves away from likeness to the visible 
world, the more important the physical relationship between world and image 
becomes.  
  The distinction I keep making between two types of camera-less photographic 
images, the photogram and “other” camera-less images, is not without reason. The 
photogram is made by a specific technique, placing the object directly onto the 
photosensitive surface, which makes the relationship between signifier and signified 
not only physical by means of the rays of light that have “touched” the object and then 
the paper, but also because of the literal physical contact between these two. “Other” 
camera-less images are produced in a wide variety of ways; this concerns all images 
that are produced without a camera, but also without physical contact between the 
depicted subject and the photosensitive surface. This category comprises images that 
are “exposed” to the referred in the most literal sense: the photosensitive layer was in 
the presence of the signified, has “faced” the signified so to speak, and registered its 
countenance. 
  In this chapter I want to return to my two case studies once again and question 
the reasons why they foreground the index. I will do this by analysing them separately 
again, because of the difference in physical relationship to the signified I just 
explained. This difference in physical relationship between referred and referent also 
yields a difference in the indexical qualities of the photographic images. It seems the 
photographic index can function in multiple ways and manifests itself differently with 
the photogram and with other camera-less photography. 
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  Finally, I will make a comparison between the results of these analyses, in order 
to be able to say something about the role of the index concerning the camera-less 
photographic record as a whole.  
Körperfotogramme as physical index 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the photogram has a twofold physical 
relationship with the subject that is depicted on it: the signified. The physicality of this 
relationship is not only embedded in the rays of light that are used to inscribe the 
image in the light sensitive surface: light rays first touching the signified and then 
touching what will become the signifier. Even more notable, in the case of the 
photogram the signifier is literally brought into contact with the signified. The object is 
placed directly onto the light sensitive material, before it is exposed to light. In the 
case of the photogram, the signified can be seen as a stamp of sorts which presses not 
its surface of ink on the paper, but its outline, by blocking the light rays from touching 
the paper.  
  Floris Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme have been created in this stamp-like fashion, 
creating a strong physical connection between the depicted bodies and the images. As 
said before, Rosalind Krauss claims that every photograph as a sign is as much icon as it 
is index. I would like to propose to shift the balance in favour of the index when it 
comes to the photogram. The twofold physical, tangible connection between the 
signified and the signifier makes the indexical, the relationship based on physical trace 
or temporal proximity to the signified, more prominent when reading the images for 
meaning. Adding to this, the photogram technique abstracts the object depicted, so 
recognisability or the iconic qualities of the signifier are diminished, making the 
physicality of the signifier even more prominent.  
  I argued before that the icon can fill in the index by providing information, so to 
speak. The iconic qualities of an image can assist the index in producing meaning by 
offering information about what we see, so we as viewers can make the connection 
between what we know and what we see and put the indexical relationship in place. In 
a way, the icon becomes the context the index needs to function. However, in the case 
of these corporeal photograms by Neusüss and the photogram in general as well, the 
icon also aids the index by not functioning as a proper icon itself. If the icon is most 
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prominent in an image, it will absorb the viewer’s attention and Batchen’s “contiguity” 
will disappear into the background. The viewer will always, first and foremost, search 
for what he recognizes from his frame of reference. So if the iconic qualities of an 
image are diminished, by technical issues or interference from the artist, the viewer 
will have more trouble to recognise and he will turn to contextual information to find 
out what he sees. This is where the index overtakes the icon and becomes the most 
prominent sign-type for the production of meaning in photographic images. As 
Neusüss himself states about these kinds of images: “A bizarre view is designed to 
point beyond the picture itself. The viewer is supposed to be stimulated to complete 
the picture for himself, to go beyond the picture, and to make connections with 
reality” (Fotografie als Kunst 21).  
  Interestingly though, as far as Neusüss is concerned, the photographer can 
never transmit his “inner disposition” (21) to the viewer by means of the image, even if 
it is capable of transforming an everyday sight into something remarkable (21), 
without instating “a generally understandable language” (22) that permits the viewer 
to read the image. It is not really clear what he means by this “language”, except that it 
is an image-savviness needed to understand what is seen, but which might also be able 
to help transmit the artist’s message. The object depicted is irrelevant, according to 
Neusüss, it is the “artistic handling of photography” by the photographer that is “thrust 
into the foreground and determines the form of the picture” (21). The photogram 
technique Neusüss employs foregrounds his artistic influence more than a 
conventional picture would, even though I feel the subject of his Körperfotogramme 
are not at all irrelevant. Thus Neusüss’ photograms make a statement not only about 
reality, about the world we see, but also about the artistic photographic process itself, 
thereby becoming “pictures for the sake of the picture itself” (20) with a meta-
photographical layer of meaning. Neusüss aptly summarizes his view on this 
foregrounding of the medium when he writes:  
  Into the lap of photography has fallen the task of representing nature true to herself  
  by means of natural laws, a task that has led photography into encounters, not with  
  that which was so bviously being portrayed (the What), but rather with the act of  
  portraying (the How). The conditions of this How have regularly been determined by  
  the technical developments in photography. (Fotografie als Kunst 17).  
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 In a discussion of one of Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme in Fotografie als Kunst, Kunst als 
Fotografie (1979) the photographer points out another aspect of photographic 
indexicality that is foregrounded by camera-less photography. When addressing the 
technicalities of the production of life-size photograms of human bodies, Neusüss 
states: “The wiping motions produced during manual development of the large 
photopaper strips can be detected as traces on the picture” (28). The wiping motions 
he describes on this page relate to a specific photogram (figure 8), which shows 
obvious lighter parts in different gradations, apparently created by influencing the 
saturation of the paper with chemicals on certain parts of the image during 
development. This is an obvious intervention of the artist in the photographic process, 
thereby influencing the final image very directly. Neusüss states that this influence of 
the artist is visible as “traces on the picture” (28). In other words, the artist is also 
indexically present in the final image by making such interventions in the photographic 
process, by leaving traces of his influence in the final product.  
  The camera-less project I Turn Myself Inside Out by Luke Evans and Josh Lake I 
already discussed briefly in the first chapter (figure 9), even though strictly speaking 
not photograms, prove that the photographer can introduce himself into his work in a 
physical, indexical manner in a similar way (Hijma 40). By ingesting small capsules 
containing pieces of photographic film, they not only make photographic images 
without a camera, but also use their very own bodies as the photographic “apparatus”. 
Granted, it could easily be argued that these images are not photographs, since the 
final product was not created by the inscription of light on photosensitive material, but 
by bodily fluids that acted upon the film. However, the photographic index still holds 
up: the subject was in the presence of the photographic material in order to produce 
these images. For example, the Elsevier Foto en Film Encyclopedie [Photo and Film 
Encyclopaedia] gives a definition of photography that fits this project by Evans and 
Lake particularly well, stating that photography is an “in fields of use generally used 
term for those techniques that capture a picture formed by light or other suitable 
radiation by means of chemicals or other physical (e.g. electronic) means” (262, my 
translation). The “other suitable radiation” that is mentioned in this definition is most 
important, extending the boundaries of photography to include images as Evans and 
Lake’s as well, but also the more common photographs by x-ray. It seems that it is not 
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the type of physical wave that determines what can be defined as photography and 
what cannot, but the actual tangible presence of the referred in front of the referent.  
  In the book Anteidola, about a project Neusüss did for the Glyptothek in 
Munich (figure 10), editor Raimund Wünsche says that the title “anti-eidola” means 
counter-image, which, according to him, the images of Neusüss are. For this project 
Neusüss made life-size photograms of antique statues in the Glyptothek, which were 
then presented on the walls next to the statues themselves. This way, the images 
became a kind of negative or counter-images of the statues, not only because of the 
juxtaposition, but also by the controversial technique that eliminates all surface 
details. The same could be said for Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme. The photogram 
technique thus produces abstracted counter-images of things, by alienating the things 
we know into shapes and shadows of which we can only determine the meaning by 
tracking where the indexical references in the images take us. The photographic index 
in the photogram is therefore a “full” index, to return to Doane’s distinction between 
types of indices. On the one hand, the photogram lacks iconic information in order for 
the icon to “take control” of the production of meaning. As a result, the index takes 
over this role, but is not hierarchical in itself: everything in the image can be an index, 
if read in this fashion. The index in the photogram is therefore chaotic and it is up to 
the reader to decide, based on contextual information, what the image is essentially 
about. On the other hand, to make matters even more complicated, the iconic 
qualities of the image can function as this contextual information, helping the viewer 
in “filling” the index.   
The Day Nobody Died as deictic index 
In the case of the camera-less photographic record that is not a photogram, so not a 
“stamp” of an object directly onto a light sensitive surface, complete abstraction is 
introduced and the icon as a sign-type for the production of meaning is abandoned 
completely. In “Review of Moholy’s Achievement” (1948) art historian Beaumont 
Newhall claims that “the logical end point of the photogram is the reduction of 
photography to the light-recording property of silver salts” (71). This end point he 
describes, seems to me to be the camera-less photographic image. It is merely the 
exposing of a photosensitive surface to light, in front of an object or a scene. The 
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connection between the signified and the signifier therefore seems weak and requires 
a lot of effort and trust from the viewer to work. Though a photogram can sustain the 
index with what little iconic information it offers, this is not the case where the 
camera-less photograph is concerned.  
  This does not mean that camera-less photography is a meaningless chaos, as 
experimental photographer and Guggenheim Fellow of Photography Robert Newton 
suggests. He argues that “abstraction in photography does not of necessity denote an 
incoherent mess. Rather it is a measure of the extent to which the corporeal object 
photographed can be distilled off to yield the subject” (Rexer 277). The subject of 
photography cannot be distilled more than in camera-less photography: no more 
figuration, nothing left to recognize but colours and undefinable shapes. 
  The contextual information plays an enormous role in the production of 
meaning for The Day Nobody Died, specifically when it comes to the nature of the 
situation it was produced in. What I mean by “nature of the situation” is the traumatic 
ambience of the Afghan war zone Broomberg and Chanarin attempted to represent. 
The word “attempt” is key here, since photographers have struggled with the 
representation of suffering for a long time. What do you show and what is too horrible 
to turn into a flat two dimensional image? And when you have decided what to show, 
then how do you show it? Broomberg and Chanarin have very deliberately decided for 
this project not to show anything, only represent the traumatic events by testifying 
what the abstract images that make up the project bore witness to (artists’ manifesto 
1-2). The Day Nobody Died is therefore a series that functions as a bystander of events, 
in the physical presence of these events. The photographic index is therefore most 
important when it comes to discerning the meaning of these images.  
  Roland Barthes states in “The Photographic Message” that “in photography the 
trauma is wholly dependent on the certainty that the scene “really” happened: the 
photographer had to be there” (209, emphasis in original). In the case of Broomberg 
and Chanarin’s project, the images themselves do not show us a scene that really 
happened, because we cannot recognize it as such. The “certainty” Barthes speaks of is 
therefore even more dependent on trusting the contextual information that is offered 
to the viewer to fill the photographic index. As Barthes continues: “the more direct the 
trauma, the more difficult is connotation” (210). In the case of The Day Nobody Died, 
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Broomberg and Chanarin have deemed the trauma of the events so intense, that they 
decided to abandon figuration and thus recognisability completely, in order to convey 
the pain and distress they witnessed through a testimonial of physical presence of the 
signifier.  
  Many scholars, such as Griselda Pollock, Ernst van Alphen and Susan Sontag, 
have addressed the representation of trauma in their writings, mostly focussing on the 
ethical side of showing agony, distress and (human) suffering. In the case of film and 
photography, this discourse is more pertinent because the images produced by these 
media are created to the likeness of the visible world, with an indexical relationship to 
reality that ensures that, as Barthes said, the photographer/filmmaker was there when 
the horrible events took place. As critic John Berger claims in his short article 
“Understanding a Photograph” (1974), the very fact that a photograph of something 
exists, asserts that the photographer deemed the subject worthy of portrayal. In other 
words, by forming a series of images that they claim represent traumatic events in a 
war zone, Broomberg and Chanarin point out to us that they considered these events 
worthy of our attention: they point us to these events.   
Context 
In the article “From Presence to the Performative: Rethinking Photographic 
Indexicality” (2003) art historians David Green and Joanna Lowry claim that the 
influence of Barthes’ Camera Lucida in photography theory and his understanding of 
photographic indexicality have distorted the discussion on the index in the following 
years: “it has led, inevitably, to a preoccupation with the origins of the photographic 
image in a chemical trace, to its relationship with time and absence, and to the 
complexity of our affective response when we encounter this evidence of a moment 
that has passed” (47). This is a particularly bold statement, since the index is very much 
concerned with all these three elements. However, Green and Lowry do not aim to 
subvert this definition of the index, but state that it does not “exhaust our 
understanding of [the photographic] indexical properties” (47-8). The two authors see 
the photograph as a performative gesture “which points to an event in the world, as a 
form of designation that draws reality into the image field, […] thus itself a form of 
indexicality” (48). The photographic index, according to them, points out to the viewer 
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what needs to be looked at, as John Berger also stated. It is already in the writings of 
Peirce himself that we see the index being defined as a pointer or indicator (Chandler 
36-7). Both Yuriko Furuhata, whose ideas I will discuss later on, as well as Green and 
Lowry see the photographic index as a kind of performative gesture, an action that 
directs the attention of the viewer. They relate it to the speech-act theory of John 
Austin, in which an utterance is not only language, but performs an action as well.  
  Images as in the series The Day Nobody Died are therefore indexical in a deictic 
way. Other than photograms which are indices full of information, which needs to be 
put into a hierarchy and connected to its meaning by the viewer, other camera-less 
photography is in itself empty on the level of signification and needs to be filled by the 
viewer. Granted, the “full” photogram-index can also be filled by the few iconic 
referents that are present in the image, but this information is present in the image 
itself. Other camera-less photographic records like The Day Nobody Died do not offer 
iconic referents within the boundaries of the image except for colours and vague 
shapes.19 All the information needed to fill the index thus comes from external 
sources, from the context. These images by Broomberg and Chanarin are therefore 
meaningless, unless they are put into context with certain information, in this case 
added by the artists’ manifesto and the video of the box. The image could thus in 
theory gain a completely different meaning when provided with a different context.20 
The only reason we grant the meaning of the war in Helmand Province of Afghanistan 
to it now, is because we put our trust in the context provided by the artists, a condition 
Green and Lowry feel has to be met in order for the photographic index to function 
(51).  
  The deictic photographic index in The Day Nobody Died thus points us towards 
what needs to be seen but cannot be represented. Rather, it is as if Broomberg and 
Chanarin want to make us as viewers experience the scene through these images, 
instead of showing it to us. Green and Lowry’s analysis of the work of Robert Barry fits 
                                                          
19 See figure 11 for an installation view of The Day Nobody Died, in which a full six meter image of the 
series can be seen. 
20 Granted, this could also be done with images that are created by means of a camera. The difference 
between these camera-less images and conventional photographs being that the camera-less image 
needs a context to produce any meaning except for colours and shapes, whereas the conventional 
photograph can also function as a “locus” of meaning on its own.  
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the project The Day Nobody Died perfectly as well:  
  [Their] production of a photographic record of these non-visible works of art might  
  seem consciously futile and absurd yet these images may be significant of our  
  understanding of the limitations of a particular form of indexical inscription. If at one  
  level these images are displayed as documentary evidence denoting a state of affairs,  
  what is also clear is that they are carefully designed to be at the limit point of  
  photography’s documentary capacity. While proving us with the indexical trace [that  
  these events happened] they also gesture towards the impossibility of recording it, and  
  our attention shifts instead towards the act of photography itself as the moment of  
  authentication. (50) 
Green and Lowry even go so far as to say that it is no longer the visual that is most 
important, but the ascertaining of what is represented by it. However, at the level of 
signification, the visual might be suppressed and signify hardly anything, but it can 
never be dispensed with, since it is the visual that makes the impact, conveys the 
affect of the image to the viewer and gets him interested in the story behind it in the 
first place (Green and Lowry 51). The photographic index can never work if the visual 
“excess” itself does not function as the signifier. Rosalind Krauss summarizes this aptly 
when she writes that what is required is a “filling of the “empty” indexical sign with a 
particular presence. The implication is that there is no convention for meaning 
independent of or apart from that presence” (“Notes” 80). 
Problematization of the photographic index 
The lesson that can be learned from these analyses is that the photographic index 
cannot exist in a void. It is not a singular, independent semiotic category that can be 
attached to something as a label as if to say: this is indexical. Instead, the photographic 
index always brings with it connotations and interpretations by means of contextual 
information, something it cannot dispense with. The index has to be supported from 
the outside. This seems to make it a paradoxical undertaking to argue for the index as 
the determining factor in the production of meaning in photography. However, when 
we think back to the three semiotic categories that Peirce coined, the icon, the index 
and the symbol, we see that neither of these categories functions on its own or 
without external information. The icon can only signify based on likeness, when the 
likeness is established by someone. The symbol refers to the signified based on 
 49 
  
agreement, so the interpreter has to be aware of this agreement in order for the sign 
to function as a symbol. And lastly, the index refers to its object based on physical 
presence, on proximity, that can never be wholly proven but has to be, in a way, 
trusted by the viewer. To make matters even more complicated, this physical presence 
does not occur in the temporal “now” of the image, but is always in the past. Thus, in 
the case of the index there is not only a spatial remove between signifier and signified 
that has to be linked together by external information, there is also a temporal 
remove.  
  In the article “Indexicality as “symptom”: Photography and Affect” (2009) 
media scholar Yuriko Furuhata also stresses the oft-overlooked temporal aspect of the 
index (184); the photograph is not only a physical trace of a scene, it is also a 
registration of that time, produced by means of time. There is a temporal gap between 
the signified and the signifier in the photographic sign, because, as said before, a 
photograph of something cannot be observed at the exact same moment as its 
production. Furuhata goes on to say that this makes the index in photography 
unintended, because “the intended referent has already vanished at the moment of 
the creation of the index” (184). According to this line of thought, the viewer is always 
looking at indices from the past, never at an index from the here-and-now. Barthes’ 
concept of “temporal anteriority” resonates strongly in this argument.   
  Where a conventional photograph is concerned, the trust that the viewer has 
to invest for the index to work will mostly be provided by the image’s iconic qualities. 
A picture of a tree is for us proof that the photosensitive material was in the presence 
of the tree, because we can see the tree in the picture and thus know it is an image of 
that specific tree. Photograms or other camera-less images stretch this trust to its 
breaking-point, because they are less figurative, hardly iconic and therefore (almost) 
unrecognizable as the thing they represent. In the case of the non-photogram camera-
less photograph, there is no iconic relationship with the referent at all, so the index 
should logically take the icon’s place and as a sign-type determine the message of the 
image. The lack of iconicity, however, also produces a lack of visual referentiality to the 
depicted scene or object for the viewer, so he will not be able to determine if this 
indexical relationship indeed overrules the icon or symbol. The only way the viewer 
can make this decision is by basing it on additional information and putting his trust in 
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the fact that this information is truthful, because the image itself cannot make any 
specific claims to the contrary.  
 The reason why the index is often related to the truth claim of photography can 
therefore be seen in two ways. On the one hand, the index is a proof of presence, of 
being a veritable testament of that which is depicted. It guarantees that the subject of 
the image has been in front of the camera and has inscribed itself by means of 
reflected rays of light into the silver salts or digital cells (Gunning 40). On the other 
hand, the image itself can never be proof that it is a veritable image of that which is 
depicted. As said, external information, via captions, accompanying texts or other 
images, have to support the truth claim that the image makes, in order for it to claim 
anything at all. The truth claim of the index is therefore circular: the index proves the 
presence of the image, but at the same time this presence can never be proven by the 
image itself.  
  What I have not fully addressed yet, but which is fundamental for the index to 
function, is the interpreter: the viewer of the image. Barthes phrases it as follows in 
“The Photographic Message”: “Thanks to its code of connotation the reading of the 
photograph is thus always historical; it depends on the reader’s “knowledge” just as 
though it were a matter of a real language [langue], intelligible only if one has learned 
the signs” (207, emphasis in original). As became clear with my earlier discussion of 
Doane’s two types of indices and Batchen’s concept of “contiguity”, the interpreter is 
of great importance each time the index is concerned, in order to connect the 
proverbial dots. Additionally, as touched upon by Barthes in the previous citation, the 
frame of reference a viewer uses to interpret the image and accompanying context 
differs with every person and also in time. It is impossible for a photographer to know 
exactly what connections the viewer will make when he sees his work. It is even 
impossible to predict who exactly will see his work. Therefore the photographer can 
only try to offer the viewer something to hold on to for interpretation of the image, by 
deliberately offering, there it is again, context.  
  It is on this point of photography’s truth claim and the viewer’s trust that 
Furuhata joins Susan Sontag in the comparison between photography and quotation: 
“A photographic inscription is, first and foremost, an infinitely repeatable semiotic sign 
that makes a claim to authenticity through its fidelity to “reality”” (Furuhata 181-2), 
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and she adds to that later that “It is at this point [of a viewer’s trust], I believe, that the 
linguistic analogy of quotation becomes particularly pertinent, since what is at stake is 
a certain willingness to suspend disbelief in the photographic index: there is a psychic 
investment or trust in the fidelity of the sign to its pre-photographic referent” (185). 
Furuhata points out that this “trust” is not only faith in the photographic record, it is a 
suspension of disbelief, meaning that the viewer always has a certain amount of 
suspicion towards images. She hints here at the training we have in reading images, 
what Barthes calls “studium”, which develops the understanding that we should not 
take every image we see to be a truthful representation of the world. We know better 
by now, because we have been misled countless times before.21 
  In the case of camera-less photography, however, this image-savviness and 
additional suspicion does not aid us in determining what the image is about, because 
we cannot even see what the image is supposed to be about by the lack of iconic 
referents. Furuhata does not see the truth claim of photography as the result of the 
camera though, because she states: “For what the photographic apparatus guarantees 
is only the mechanical transmission of light and its interaction with chemicals; it does 
not explain the trust or belief that we have in the connection between this sign and its 
referent” (185). We can deduct from this argument that for the media scholar the 
truth claim of photography does not come from the fact that the images are sharp, 
mechanical reproductions of the visible world. No, the belief comes from the 
recognisability of the images, as “quotes” of the world.  
  This is the point where I disagree with Furuhata. She states that the photograph 
has a two-fold analogical relationship with the world: it is materially analogical, but 
also mimetically analogical to the visible world. This last meaning, she says, shows that 
the analogical no longer points to the physical relation between sign22 and signifier, 
only to mimetic qualities (Furuhata 183). I agree that the analogical properties of 
                                                          
21 Examples of instances where observers of photographs were misled can be found numerous times in 
the history of World Press Photo. Even though the World Press Photo competition makes use of strict 
regulations concerning photo manipulation in press photography, there is a scandal almost every year 
after the selection is presented and proof is uncovered that one of the selected photographs has been 
tampered with prior to submission to the contest.  
22 Furuhata uses the term “sign” here to indicate the opposite of the signifier, a pitfall often fallen into 
by scholars using semiotic terms. I feel usage of the term “sign” to indicate the signified makes matters 
unnecessarily complicated, because De Saussure demonstrated that the sign is the whole of both 
signifier and signified together.   
 52 
  
photography points to its mimetic relationship with the world, but I do not agree that 
this implies no physical relationship between the sign and the referent. Granted, 
Furuhata does not claim that this relationship does not exist, she merely says it is not 
foregrounded. However, from a technical point of view, how would a mimetic 
photograph even come into being without a physical relationship between signified 
and the signifier? Furuhata stretches her point too far here by dismissing the physical 
relationship between signifier and signified, while it is exactly this physical bond that 
makes the mimetic photographic image possible. 
Conclusion 
Returning to Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme and Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day 
Nobody Died one last time has helped me prove that the photographic index in the 
camera-less photographic record can have two different forms. In both the case of the 
photogram as well as the “other” camera-less photograph the index overrules the 
iconic qualities of the images, because the icon is diminished due to the level of 
abstraction of the images. However, this is also where these two kinds of camera-less 
photography differ from each other. 
  Floris Neusüss’ photograms of human bodies prove that the photographic index 
becomes foregrounded when the images do not offer the viewer extensive iconic 
information to discern what the image is about. Nevertheless, the photograms still 
offer some iconic signifiers that support the index in functioning as an index. The iconic 
information has to be used to instate hierarchy in the abundance of indices that are 
transmitted by the images. The photogram technique, putting an object directly onto a 
photosensitive layer, asserts a strong physical presence of the signified on the signifier. 
The photographic indices in these photograms are therefore full, “noisy” indices, which 
can be put into hierarchy by what little iconic information that is offered. 
  The images from Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin’s The Day Nobody Died 
are completely abstracted and thus offer no iconic information at all. The consequence 
of this is that the index, the photographic sign as a trace of what it was a witness of, is 
the only thing signified by the images. However, in and of themselves the images do 
not transmit any information except for colours and shapes. The photographic indices 
only function as physical presence of that which they represent when contextual 
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information about the scene or object represented is offered. In the case of the 
“other” camera-less record the photographic index is therefore deictic: it is an empty 
sign in itself, which can only signify something particular by means of framing.  
  Thus both these types of photographic indices have to be supported from 
outside of themselves. However, the physical presence the index asserts is even 
stronger with these camera-less works than with the conventional photograph. The 
index therefore triumphs with the camera-less photographic record, but it also 
problematizes it.  
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Conclusion 
The essential indexical 
 
The question that guided this thesis was: how does the photographic index function as 
the determining factor in the production of meaning in the camera-less case studies 
Körperfotogramme (1960-1983) by Floris Neusüss and the project The Day Nobody 
Died (2008) by Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin? I opted to answer this question 
in three steps: the previous three chapters.  
  In chapter one, I set out to discuss clearly what I understand the semiotic 
categories of icon and index to be. I based my understanding of these terms on the 
semiotic teachings of Charles Sanders Peirce, who appropriated the two part sign-
theory of Ferdinand de Saussure that a sign consists of a signifier and a signified, and 
divided the signifier into three different categories: the icon, the index and the symbol. 
Only the first two categories are important for my argument. The icon, Peirce states, is 
the type of signifier that refers to its signified based on likeness to it. The index, on the 
other hand, refers to its signified based on proximity of the signified: the signifier is a 
physical trace of the signified. According to art historian Rosalind Krauss, the 
conventional photograph is as iconic as it is indexical. It not only refers to its signified 
based on likeness, it also has a physical relationship with this signified because of the 
rays of light that first touched the object depicted and then the photosensitive layer to 
produce the image.   
  In addition to this discussion of the semiotic terms icon and index and the 
semiotic value of the conventional photograph, I briefly highlighted some historical 
examples of camera-less photography by William Henry Fox Talbot, Anna Atkins, László 
Moholy-Nagy and Man Ray, to show that their reasons for “going” camera-less were 
different from the reasons contemporary photographers have. For Fox Talbot and 
Atkins, the camera’s that were available at the time were inadequate for their goal: to 
produce images that conveyed scientific, factual information about the portrayed 
objects. That is why these photographers chose to use the photogram technique. For 
Moholy-Nagy and Man Ray, the renouncing of the camera was for conceptual reasons: 
the former wanted a mode of vision that was as mechanical as possible, the latter 
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found the camera to be limiting.  
  In contrast to these historical examples, I analysed contemporary camera-less 
projects by discussing the two recent publications on camera-less photography: Martin 
Barnes’ Shadow Catchers and Geoffrey Batchen’s Emanations. Contemporary artists 
who renounce the camera do not seem to do this because of technical reasons nor do 
they want to create images with the least possible amount of interference by the 
photographer. Artists as Susan Derges, Garry Fabian Miller and Floris Neusüss choose 
to work with the photosensitive material only, because it offers them more artistic 
freedom. Furthermore, the one-on-one scale images the photogram technique 
produces, is another characteristic that is often exploited. It must be said that even 
nowadays camera-less photography is almost always analogue in nature, because the 
material is relatively cheap and still fairly easily available.  
  Two types of contemporary camera-less photography can be discerned. On the 
one hand there is the photogram, which is produced by placing an object directly onto 
a photosensitive surface and exposing it to light, producing an outline of the object. On 
the other hand there is the “other” camera-less photographic record, which is created 
by exposing the photosensitive surface to the object or scene (and therefore also to 
light). This last technique yields only colours and vague shapes, no sharp images of the 
signified. 
  In the second chapter, I used this groundwork on both the semiotic terms of 
icon and index and the characteristics of contemporary camera-less photography from 
the first chapter to frame the index in photography theory. Various scholars, such as 
the previously discussed Tom Gunning, have argued against the index as a concept for 
meaning production in photography. Close analysis of their arguments reveals that, 
much like Gunning’s argument, they attempt to dismiss the index yet still adhere to it, 
only naming it differently. Gunning sees the photographic index as superfluous 
“noise”: everything in a picture can refer to something based on proximity because it 
was there in front of the camera, but that does not mean that it gains meaning 
because it is there. However, as my discussion of Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme has 
shown, the full or “noisy” index can still be the determining factor for meaning 
production, when it is supported by iconic signifiers that help fill the indices with 
information.  
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  Conversely, as stated before, Rosalind Krauss argued that the photograph is 
both icon and index. She sees the photographic index as a “shifter”, borrowing a 
concept from linguist Roman Jakobson. By “shifter” Krauss means that the 
photographic index only gains meaning in a certain context, as for example personal 
pronouns also do. Another term that is often used to describe this type of signifier is 
“deixis”. The index itself is empty, according to this reasoning. 
  Thus, scholars usually take position on either the side of the full index or on the 
side of the empty, deictic index. Mary Ann Doane argues that it is not necessarily 
either/or: both types can occur, depending on the type of image. In the third chapter I 
analysed Neusüss’ Körperfotogramme and Broomberg and Chanarin’s The Day Nobody 
Died once again in relation to the photographic index and showed that Neusüss’ 
photograms are examples of full, “noisy” indices and Broomberg and Chanarin’s 
project only works in the given context, making the indices they transmit empty in and 
of themselves. Both these case studies foreground the photographic index, because of 
the diminished or lack of iconicity that is a result of the camera-less technique, 
abstracting the images. In both cases the index asserts that the photographic record 
was a witness, in the proximity of what it represents, whether we can make out what 
that is by means of iconic signifiers or not. 
  These two case studies therefore show that the photographic index is twofold; 
it is either full and lacks hierarchy or it is empty and in need of a context to frame it in. 
In the case of contemporary camera-less photography, be it photograms or “other” 
camera-less projects, the index triumphs over the icon as the determining factor in the 
production of meaning by the photograph, but it cannot do this on its own. The 
photographic index is always in need of support from outside of itself, either by iconic 
signifiers as in the case of the photogram or by contextual information as in the case of 
the “other” camera-less photographic record. The photographic index is therefore 
indispensable for the production of meaning when it comes to camera-less 
photography, but it cannot stand alone.  
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Appendix 1 – images  
 
Figure 1. Neusüss, Floris. “Untitled.” Körperfotogramme. Berlin. Gelatin-silver print. 1962. 
Berlin: Collection Christian Diener. 
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Figure 2. Derges, Susan. Vessel No. 3 (1). 1995. Dye destruction print. 46 cm x 46 cm.  
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Figure 3. Fabian Miller, Garry. Becoming Magma, New Year, January 2005. 2005. Dye destruction print. 
41 cm x 30,5 cm.  
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Figure 4. Fuss, Adam. From the series My Ghost. 1999. Gelatin-silver print. 134,6 cm x 113 cm. 
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Figure 5. Cordier, Pierre. Chemigram 8/2/61. 1961. Chemigram. 49,4 cm x 58,4 cm. 
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Figure 6. Broomberg, Adam and Oliver Chanarin. “The Press Conference.” (detail)  
The Day Nobody Died. 2008. Unique C-type print. 726 mm x 6000 mm. 
 
Figure 7. Broomberg, Adam and Oliver Chanarin. “The Day of One Hundred Dead, June 8, 
2008.” (detail) The Day Nobody Died. 2008. Unique C-type print. 762 mm x 6000 mm. 
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Figure 8. Neusüss, Floris. Figurenfotogramm, positive, gewischt. [Figure photogram, positive, 
whisked] 1964. 
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Figure 9. Evans, Luke and Josh Lake. I Turn Myself Inside Out. 2013. Collection Saatchi Gallery 
London. 
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Figure 10. Neusüss, Floris. “Kopf eines Jünglings.” Anteidola. 2001. 60 cm x 50 cm. 
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Figure 11. Broomberg, Adam and Oliver Chanarin. “Installation view.” The Day Nobody Died. 
2008. 
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Appendix 2 – diagrams 
 
 
Diagram 1. Hijma, Cobie. Conventional photography: light source, subject and camera. 
2016. 
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